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Quantified Logic of Awareness and Impossible Possible Worlds
Abstract
Among the many possible approaches to dealing with logical omniscience, I consider here awareness and
impossible worlds structures. The former approach, pioneered by Fagin and Halpern, distinguishes between
implicit and explicit knowledge, and avoids logical omniscience with respect to explicit knowledge. The latter,
developed by Rantala and by Hintikka, allows for the existence of logically impossible worlds to which the
agents are taken to have “epistemological” access; since such worlds need not behave consistently, the agents’
knowledge is fallible relative to logical omniscience. The two approaches are known to be equally expressive in
propositional systems interpreted over Kripke semantics. In this paper I show that the two approaches are
equally expressive in propositional systems interpreted over Montague-Scott (neighborhood) semantics.
Furthermore, I provide predicate systems of both awareness and impossible worlds structures interpreted on
neighborhood semantics and prove the two systems to be equally expressive.
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